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Swept Under the Rug:                               
Integrating Critical Race Theory into the         
Legal Debate on the Use of Race 
By Justin P. Walsh1 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 3, 1998, Washington State voters, by a large majority, 
passed Ballot Initiative 200 (I-200), the Washington State Civil Rights Act.2  
Despite its progressive title, I-200 essentially ended affirmative action in 
Washington by denying the state the ability to grant race-based preferences 
in hiring, public contracting, or education.3  In an effort to achieve racial 
diversity within its schools, Seattle Public School District No. 1 had been 
using and continued to use race as a tiebreaker in deciding which children 
would attend certain schools that were perceived as “academically 
superior.”4  A lawsuit followed, brought by parents of students prevented 
from attending these schools.5  While the suit was pending, the school 
district abandoned the use of the racial tiebreaker, leading to an increase in 
de facto segregation6 within these academically superior schools.7  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ruled that the Seattle School District’s 
use of the racial tiebreaker was an unconstitutional method of ameliorating 
de facto segregation.8 
Through the lens of critical race theory, this comment argues that both I-
200 and the Court’s reasoning in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS)9 are flawed because both are based on 
colorblind models that fail to account for white privilege.  To this end, this 
comment will first give a general overview of critical race theory and 
contrast it with colorblind individualism.  Second, this comment will 
provide a synopsis of the factual background and procedural history of 
PICS.  Third, this comment will examine I-200, including the forces that led 
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to its passage and codification into law, the actual effects of I-200 and 
similar measures on education, and the state’s arguments about I-200 in the 
PICS case.  Fourth, this comment will examine the PICS decision and will 
discuss the flawed assumptions that ultimately guided the Court to rule 
against the school district.  Finally, this comment will propose future 
litigation strategies that integrate critical race theory.  
I. THE CRITICAL RACE THEORY FRAMEWORK  
Critical race theory is a positivist body of scholarship, primarily created 
by people of color, aimed at breaking down the barriers of racism 
“institutionalized in and by law.”10   
Three concepts tied to critical race theory are utilized throughout this 
comment: white privilege, institutionalized racism, and structural racism.  
White privilege, at its core, is “an invisible package of unearned assets” that 
white people may rely on, though unaware of its presence.11  The concept is 
likened to “an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, 
assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, 
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.”12  Institutionalized racism 
defines systemic barriers that operate to offer “differential access to the 
goods, services, and opportunities of society by race.”13  Structural racism 
refers to the systematic maintenance of “racial hierarchies established in 
prior eras by embedding white privilege and nonwhite disadvantage in 
policies, institutions, and cultural representations.”14 
Opponents of affirmative action contend that racism no longer exists in 
America.15  While levels of overt racism have greatly decreased in the last 
few decades,16 progress will be impossible without addressing other forms 
of racism.17  Significantly, when “racism is embedded in our thought 
processes and social structures . . ., then the ‘ordinary business’ of society—
the routines, practices, and institutions that we rely on to effect the world’s 
work—will keep minorities in subordinate positions.”18 
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The sad reality is that the ordinary business of society, even within 
education, reinforces this subordination.  White students do have an 
advantage.19  In one study, forty-six separate and distinct privileges were 
attributable to the simple fact that a person was white.20  People are 
reluctant to admit that there are white race privileges prevalent in everyday 
life.21  Albert Black, a noted civil rights activist and lecturer at the 
University of Washington, has succinctly captured the ignorance of white 
privilege in one demonstrative sentence: “I don’t have any prejudices 
against blacks, but I’m not giving up my opportunities and my privileged 
positions.”22  
According to critical race theory, affirmative action is not a grant of an 
advantage, but a remedial leveler.  As affirmative action is “designed to 
overcome the effects of discrimination,” the advantage granted to nonwhites 
“should not be treated as ordinary discrimination.”23  Affirmative action 
opponents attack the views of proponents, arguing that such views actually 
demonstrate a diminished understanding of the subject.24  Perhaps the 
biggest misconception on which affirmative action opponents operate is that 
the rights of the disadvantaged can be better effected through the 
amendment process, free speech, peaceable assembly, petition, and ballot.25  
While true in theory, the argument fails to consider the effects on the 
disadvantaged in relation to the curtailment of those rights.  While ballot 
initiatives are an available process, they come at an economic price most 
cannot afford.26  The political process argument entirely ignores the fact that 
some states have even enacted wholesale blockades to minority access to 
government.27 
Because the discussion in legislation and cases currently centers around a 
race-neutral framework, we must craft race-neutral arguments that are based 
on an accurate view of race.  
676 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
RACE AND EDUCATION 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF PICS 
The PICS case originally involved both state and federal claims, and it 
went on to develop a complicated procedural history.  In an attempt to 
render the case more accessible, this section will provide the factual 
background of the case as well as a summary of its procedural history.    
 In 1997, due to overwhelming demand at five of its secondary schools, 
the Seattle School District instituted a system of “tiebreakers” to allocate 
students to the limited number of slots within these schools.28  Students 
were asked to “list which high school they would like to attend in order of 
preference.”29  Prior to the PICS lawsuit, only one of the tiebreakers was 
based on race.30  The first tiebreaker was based upon sibling attendance at 
the school of choice.31  The second tiebreaker, utilized only where the 
school was considered racially out of balance, was based on the race of the 
student.32  A high-demand school was considered racially out of balance if 
the percentage population of white to nonwhite students deviated more than 
15 percent from the overall population.33  If a school was considered 
racially in balance—the school deviated less than 15 percent from the 
general population in terms of racial makeup—the racial tiebreaker was not 
employed.34  In those instances, the school district turned either to a 
tiebreaker based on proximity of the student’s home to the school or a 
lottery system.35  At the time of the district court opinion, only three of the 
five high-demand schools were utilizing the racial tiebreaker.36 
After I-200 was passed, a lawsuit was brought by a group of parents 
whose children were either denied, or could have been denied, admission to 
these high-demand schools.37  The group of parent plaintiffs, calling 
themselves Parents Involved in Community Schools, claimed that the 
district’s racial tiebreaker violated I-200, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38  The 
case led to a web of litigation and appeals.  The federal district court 
concluded that the school district was within its rights on both the state and 
federal law claims.39  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
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federal district court on the state law claim, and it refused to answer the 
federal claims on grounds of constitutional avoidance.40   
The Ninth Circuit then made a highly unusual move—it withdrew its 
opinion and, in the process, certified the state law claim to the Washington 
Supreme Court.41  The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the school 
district had not violated the provisions of I-200, thus ending the state law 
claim.42  The case was then returned to the Ninth Circuit, as the resolution 
of the Fourteenth Amendment claim had become outcome determinative.43  
A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the school district’s 
interest in promoting diversity was a compelling state interest, but that the 
district’s means to achieve that diversity were not narrowly tailored.44  The 
district then petitioned for rehearing before the court en banc.45  On 
rehearing, the court en banc switched course and affirmed the district court 
ruling on the equal protection claim and the Title VI claim.46  The U.S. 
Supreme Court then granted certiorari.47  The Court reversed, holding the 
tiebreaker invalid.48   
Due to the procedural complexity, the federal and state claims will be 
addressed separately in the sections that follow.   
III. I-200: AN UNLIKELY FRIEND IN WASHINGTON STATE 
A. Forces that Led to I-200’s Passage and Codification into Law 
The pertinent text of I-200, codified as the Washington Civil Rights Act, 
reads as follows: 
(1) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting. 
 …. 
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(6) This section does not prohibit action that must be taken to 
establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, if 
ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state. 
(7) For the purposes of this section, “state” includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, public 
college or university, community college, school district, special 
district, or other political subdivision or governmental 
instrumentality of or within the state. 
 …. 
(9) This section shall be self-executing.  If any part or parts of this 
section are found to be in conflict with federal law, the United 
States Constitution, or the Washington State Constitution, the 
section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that federal 
law, the United States Constitution, and the Washington state 
Constitution permit.  Any provision held invalid shall be severable 
from the remaining portions of this section.49 
The actual language of I-200 seems to aid in the curtailment of 
discrimination.50  However, by outlawing all preferential treatment based on 
race, I-200 fails to distinguish between preferential treatment of whites as a 
result of white privilege and treatment of people of color that is an attempt 
to remedy historical discrimination.51  As a result, I-200 effectively put an 
end to state and local affirmative action and race-conscious admission 
processes.   
Although many consider Washington a progressive state, this arguably 
regressive measure received 58 percent of the vote,52 leaving many to 
wonder how such an initiative could have passed.  Unfortunately, however, 
Washington is not alone in passing regressive race-based initiatives.   
When looking at the initiative and referendum process from a national 
perspective, the statistics reveal a disturbing trend.  Nationwide, between 
1904 and 1949, there were no initiatives presented that were facially 
discriminatory.53  However, with the onset of the civil rights movement 
spurring discriminatory sentiment, eleven discriminatory initiatives were 
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introduced, nine of which passed.54  Then, between 1991 and 1994, five 
discriminatory initiatives were introduced, only two of which passed;55 this 
appeared to be a cooling period, representing a reluctance to pass 
discriminatory legislation.  However, that period was short lived.  Between 
1995 and 1998, four discriminatory initiatives were introduced and all 
passed; most notable were I-200 and California’s Proposition 209.56  This 
renewed vigor shows no signs of slowing—between 1999 and 2000, five 
facially discriminatory initiatives were introduced with only one failing in 
the vote.57  Since 2000, discriminatory initiatives have been introduced in 
several states, including an initiative in Michigan similar to I-200 that 
passed due to the same forces at work in Washington and California.58 
An exploration into this increase in discriminatory initiatives reveals that 
one man is primarily responsible for the most recent onslaught of such 
initiatives.  That man is Ward Connerly, the director of the American Civil 
Rights Institute (ACRI).59  Through ACRI, Connerly spearheaded the 
campaigns to pass Proposition 209 in California, I-200 in Washington, and 
Proposition 2 in Michigan.60  
ACRI’s mission is to “educate the public about racial and gender 
preferences.”61  However, this “educational” role has largely been aimed at 
the passage of state initiatives that eliminate affirmative action programs.62  
ACRI is able to finance these initiative pushes through the use of money 
donated by far right conservative backers.63  The Bradley Foundation, one 
of Connerly’s largest financers, has also bankrolled research efforts that are 
overtly racist in their endeavors.64 
By engaging in inaccurate rhetoric, flaunting an ignorance of white 
privilege, failing to consider legitimate reasons for continuing affirmative 
action, and using unscrupulous campaign finance reporting (mirroring the 
same flawed process as was used prior with Proposition 209 in California 
and later with Proposition 2 in Michigan65), Connerly and other opponents 
of affirmative action were able to secure passage of I-200 by a wide margin 
in 1998. 
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First, opponents of affirmative action used inaccurate rhetoric to frame 
the affirmative action debate, classifying affirmative action as reverse 
discrimination.66  A common reverse discrimination argument relies on the 
assumption that when the state grants a benefit—for instance, placement 
above another candidate with higher test scores—to a minority applicant 
based on race, the state is in fact granting that minority applicant a privilege 
and, at the same time, taking an opportunity away from the white applicant 
who did not prevail.67  However, this view of the “innocent white victim” 
fails to consider that white applicants benefit from white privilege, which 
functions as a kind of undocumented affirmative action program.68  If 
innocence centers on an “absence of advantage at the expense of others,”69 
there is nothing innocent about a white person’s status entering into the 
application process—he or she carries the advantage of white privilege at 
the expense of all nonwhite applicants.70  Rather, affirmative action, as 
practiced today, does not constitute reverse discrimination but functions 
only as a leveler.71  The innocent white victim argument is further belied by 
the fact that the innocent white victims only seek redress against minority 
candidates that have entered into programs on the basis of subjective 
factors, but not against other white candidates granted admission with lower 
test scores than the candidate who brought suit.72 
Second, by failing to acknowledge white privilege, opponents of 
affirmative action lend credence to the innocent white victim argument.  
The repression of the existence of white privilege makes the innocent white 
victim argument plausible. 73  For example, a white person may feel that he 
or she did not get a job because it went to a less qualified black candidate.74  
However, the reality is that the job simply went to an equally or better 
qualified candidate, who, through circumstances of structural and 
institutional racism, only appeared to be less qualified given standards of 
measurement favoring whites.75   
Third, the opposition to I-200 did not consider legitimate reasons as to 
why affirmative action is still warranted.  Specifically, minority students 
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and contractors do not operate on a level playing field with white students 
and contractors.  Prior to the passage of I-200 in Washington, minority 
contracting only accounted for 4.9 percent of state contract awards.76  
Currently, without the use of affirmative action, less than 1 percent of 
contracts are awarded to minority businesses.77  There may be an even 
greater need for affirmative action in education.  Graduation from high 
school—an achievement white students rarely have trouble attaining—is 
often a hard-fought accomplishment for nonwhite students.78  Race-
sensitive programs ameliorate that achievement gap by continuing 
desegregation.79 
Finally, campaign finance issues affected the outcome as well.  Ward 
Connerly, through ACRI, failed to disclose campaign finance spending that 
completely flouted the laws of the state.80  In the campaign for I-200, 
Connerly reported just over $500,000 in expenditures.81  Several articles 
indicated that the disparate funding, with the campaign against I-200 
garnering almost three times as much in spending, was a sure sign of the 
will of the voters.82  However, a report by the Washington State Public 
Disclosure Commission found that Connerly failed to disclose over half a 
million dollars in radio ads spent to “educate the public” about affirmative 
action.83  The Commission did not sanction Connerly, choosing to admonish 
him instead.84   
Unfortunately, Washington was only the first state in which Connerly 
flouted his campaign finance disclosure obligations.  He was fined $95,000 
for engaging in similar tactics in a 2003 California initiative.85  While we 
may never be certain how much these actions contributed to the passage of 
I-200, we can be assured that the added expenditures played a part.   
B. The Effects of I-200 on Diversity in Education 
In the eight years since its passage, I-200 has been detrimental to 
minority access to education.  Prior to 1998, minority groups were making 
great strides in education via diversity programs.86  Between 1998 and 
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2004, participation by minority groups actually declined, even though 
enrollment in professional programs at the University of Washington 
increased in size dramatically.87  Similarly, the effects of race neutrality can 
be seen at the secondary education level.  Introduced in 1998, the Seattle 
School District used a racial tiebreaker88 program in order to determine 
placement in certain schools that, because of their popularity and perceived 
superiority to other schools in the district, could not accommodate all who 
wished to enroll.89  Since abandoning the racial tiebreaker program, 
diversity has decreased by 10 percent at each of these oversubscribed 
schools.90  
Washington is not alone in facing a crisis in minority education because 
of race-neutral admissions programs.  California is also dealing with similar 
issues from the passage of Proposition 209.91  As a result of Proposition 
209, black enrollment at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) 
has decreased to its lowest percentage since 1973—to just over 2 percent of 
the incoming freshman class.92  Prior to the passage of the race-neutral 
amendment, UCLA enrolled black students at a rate close to California’s 
black population.93  Michigan now faces the same crisis with the passage of 
Proposition 2 in November 2006, which contains virtually the same 
language as the California and Washington legislation.94 
Conversely, in Washington State, private universities are not subject to 
the race-neutral (and thus racially discriminatory) restrictions of I-200.95  A 
comparison between the University of Washington and Seattle University 
shows that as early as 2000, just two years after the passage of I-200, 
underrepresented minority enrollment at Seattle University was nearly 
double that of the University of Washington.96  The disparity can also be 
found in graduate programs, where underrepresented minorities make up 
6.7 percent of the graduate student body at the University of Washington, as 
opposed to 9 percent of the graduate student body at Seattle University.97  In 
light of these numbers, to say that race-neutral admissions programs do not 
hinder minority access to education is simply to ignore fact. 
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C. Did the School District Violate I-200? 
1. State Claim at the District Court 
The PICS plaintiffs first brought suit in federal court under a claim that 
the race preference plan discriminated and granted a preference on the basis 
of race in violation of I-200.98  As I-200 did not define preference or 
discrimination, and as Washington courts had not addressed the issue, the 
federal district court was tasked with predicting how the Washington 
Supreme Court would apply I-200 to the PICS case.99   
The court found that applying I-200 to the school district’s racial 
tiebreaker program would violate the Washington State Constitution.100  
The court reasoned that, under the Washington State Constitution, school 
districts had a duty to “provide equal educational opportunities to students 
of all races, to limit racial isolation, and to provide a racially and ethnically 
diverse educational experience.”101  The court noted that the school board 
had a duty to “‘act in the best interests of the majority of students,’ even if 
to do so would be to the detriment of some students,” and to not allow 
school boards to “take race into account in efforts to desegregate their 
schools ‘would frustrate the purpose’” of the constitution.102   
While the analysis could have ended there, the court also looked at the 
broader question of whether racial tiebreakers in and of themselves violated 
I-200 by discriminating or granting preference to students based on race.103  
The district court held that the use of a racial tiebreaker “does not constitute 
a ‘preference’ or ‘discrimination’ based on race under Initiative 200.”104  In 
supporting this finding, the court looked to earlier decisions that permitted 
school board efforts to remedy de facto segregation and to a finding by the 
Washington Supreme Court that such efforts were not violations of the state 
constitution.105  Finally, the court turned to the language of I-200; it held 
that because the school district’s action applied to and affected both 
minority and white students in the same manner, it did not discriminate or 
grant a preference based on race.106 
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2. State Claim at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court on 
several bases.  The court first disagreed that the race-conscious tiebreaker 
did not grant a preference or discriminate based on race.107  The court 
reasoned that “the racial tiebreaker grants an advantage or preference on the 
basis of race: members of one group are selected for admission, while 
members of another are not, solely on the basis of race.”108  The court also 
disagreed with the district court’s constitutional analysis, reasoning 
although race-conscious programs were a permissible use of school board 
discretion under the constitution, such programs were not necessarily 
mandated and thus could be statutorily limited.109 
3. Washington State Answers the Certified Question 
Of course, all of that reasoning was for naught as the court of appeals 
then withdrew its opinion and certified the question at hand to the 
Washington Supreme Court.110  The exact question certified to the supreme 
court was: 
By using a racial tiebreaker to determine high school assignments, 
does Seattle School District Number 1 “discriminate against, or 
grant preferential treatment to, any individual group on the basis of 
race, . . . color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of . . . 
public education” in violation of Initiative 200 (I-200), codified at 
Washington Revised Code § 49.60.400?111 
The Washington Supreme Court held that the racial tiebreaker did not 
violate I-200.112  The court first reasoned that the Washington State 
Constitution established a mandate, above all others, that the state provide 
general and uniform education.  The court then reasoned that school boards 
were given the leeway to conclude what that constitutional requirement 
would entail.113  The court explained that “allowing a referendum on 
administrative decisions ‘would enable the voters of any community to 
frustrate the purpose of Const. art 9, § 1.’”114   
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Next, the court examined whether the race-conscious program was 
preferential or discriminatory.115  Here, the court also largely agreed with 
the district court that the racial tiebreaker did not discriminate or grant 
preferential treatment.116  The court rebutted the court of appeals analysis 
that the language of I-200 was not susceptible to multiple meanings by 
looking at the structure of the statute, dictionary definitions, and how 
preference and discrimination had previously been used in terms of 
affirmative action arguments.117   
Finally, the court analyzed the ballot wording, which specified reverse 
discrimination measures as the focus of I-200—that I-200 “prohibits only 
those programs that use race or gender to select a less qualified applicant 
over a more deserving applicant.”118  Because the Washington Supreme 
Court could answer the certified question by interpreting the statutory 
language, it did not reach the question of whether the Washington State 
Constitution mandated efforts to end de facto segregation, but the result was 
the same: a holding that the school district’s program was not in violation of 
I-200.119 
Unfortunately, due to the outcome of the equal protection claim, the 
effect of the Washington Supreme Court decision was nullified. 
IV. FEDERAL CLAIMS IN PICS 
As previously mentioned, the plaintiffs originally brought both state and 
federal claims.  When the Washington Supreme Court issued its decision, 
however, the state claim was resolved.  The only remaining claim was 
whether the federal district court erred in holding that the racial tiebreaker 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth  
Amendment.120  In this section, this comment will first describe and then 
analyze the reasoning of the PICS case at the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In analyzing equal protection claims based on race, courts must apply 
strict scrutiny to the challenged program. 121  In this case, courts had to first 
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decide whether the school district had a compelling state interest in utilizing 
the tiebreaker, and second, whether the race-conscious tiebreaker was 
narrowly tailored to meet that end.122 
A. District Court 
The district court found that there was a compelling state interest in the 
use of the racial tiebreaker and that the district’s program was narrowly 
tailored, as the ends it sought to achieve were not just related to diversity 
but also included the aim of ending de facto segregation, which requires 
racial diversity.123  In addition, the court ruled the program was narrowly 
tailored because it was not indefinite in nature but instead had a sunset 
provision.124 
B. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals  
When the case returned to the Ninth Circuit from the Washington 
Supreme Court, the court held that diversity was a compelling state interest, 
largely based on the decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.125  In doing so, the 
court referenced a variety of briefs filed on behalf of the University of 
Michigan in Grutter, which touted scientifically and socially measurable 
benefits that flow from diversity.126  The Ninth Circuit then turned to the 
question of whether the racial tiebreaker was narrowly tailored to achieve 
diversity.  The Ninth Circuit held that it was not127 because (1) “[t]he 
School District’s racial tiebreaker [was] virtually indistinguishable from a 
racial quota;”128 (2) the school district’s tiebreaker was inflexible;129 (3) the 
school district’s use of the racial tiebreaker was mechanical and 
conclusive;130 (4) the school district had failed to consider race neutral 
alternatives;131 and (5) the school district’s program did not minimize the 
adverse impacts on third parties.132   
The dissent, written by Judge Graber, differed from the majority in a 
number of respects.  First, the dissent noted that not only was diversity a 
compelling state interest but that ending de facto segregation was as well.133  
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Second, the dissent noted that the considerations of diversity in the high 
school setting might very well differ from those in the postsecondary 
setting.134  Finally, the dissent expressed its view that the school district had 
satisfied the narrowly tailored burden and that the consideration of race-
neutral alternatives was inapplicable because of the district’s compelling 
interest in remedying de facto segregation.135 
C. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Sitting En Banc 
A petition for en banc review of the decision was then granted by the 
Ninth Circuit.136  From the start, the court explained that the strict scrutiny 
standard applied to both “deck reshuffle” (those programs that do not 
attempt to burden or benefit any particular group in its use of race) and 
“deck stacking” programs (those programs that use race to distribute a 
burden or benefit to a particular group).137  The court explained that the 
whole point of strict scrutiny was to make the state actor prove that the 
motivations for a race-based system were not invidious, and there is 
“simply no way of determining . . . what classifications are in fact 
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.”138 
The court en banc then turned to the notion of compelling state interest.  
The court largely agreed with the reasoning of the district court, noting that 
the school district had shown its diversity rationale to be a compelling 
interest through (1) improved critical thinking skills for all students based 
on racial diversity, (2) distinct socialization and citizenship advantages, and 
(3) increased “opportunity networks in the areas of education and 
employment.”139  The court also noted that while similar to Grutter in many 
ways, the interests in the PICS case varied in three very real respects: (1) 
secondary education served a unique role in desegregation; (2) many 
students would not be able to reap the benefits of diverse education outside 
of the secondary education setting; and (3) the benefits of racial diversity 
are more compelling at a younger age.140  The court held that the school 
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district had demonstrated a compelling state interest similar to the law 
school in Grutter “as well as the additional compelling educational and 
social benefits of such diversity unique to the public secondary school 
context.”141 
The court also agreed with Judge Graber’s determination that avoiding 
the harms resulting from de facto segregation was a compelling state 
interest.142  Using similar wording and referencing the same cases as Judge 
Graber, the court explained the compelling nature of reducing racial 
isolation.143  The court also made short work of the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the school district was not engaged in desegregation but rather was engaged 
in racial balancing.  The court referred to Brown v. Board of Education to 
explain that “[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools 
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children.  The impact is greater 
when it has the sanction of law.”144  Thus, Brown is an example of how the 
Supreme Court has, in the past, acknowledged the negative impact of any 
segregation, including de facto segregation.  The court then listed several 
cases holding that voluntary desegregation—desegregation not mandated by 
the Supreme Court in Brown—was a “sound educational policy within the 
discretion of local school officials.”145 
Having determined that both sets of interests were compelling, the court 
then turned to whether the means to achieve those interests were narrowly 
tailored.146  The court started its analysis by first recognizing that narrow 
tailoring depends on the particular situation.147  The court noted a five-part 
test, which it had earlier outlined in its application of the Grutter and Gratz 
cases, designed to determine if an affirmative action plan was narrowly 
tailored.148  The court explained that a properly narrowly tailored 
affirmative action plan contained five hallmarks: “(1) individualized 
consideration of applicants; (2) the absence of quotas; (3) serious, good-
faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative action 
program; (4) that no member of any racial group [is] unduly harmed; and 
(5) that the program [has] a sunset provision or some other end point.”149   
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The court exempted public schools from the first requirement.  The court 
reasoned where all children were admitted in at least one school in the 
district, regardless of qualifications, there were no “considerations or 
qualifications at issue.”150  The court also recognized that the consideration 
must be tailored to the compelling interests: in Grutter, the law school 
sought diversity of ideas; in the PICS case, the school district sought both to 
foster racial understanding and to ameliorate de facto segregation.151  Given 
these goals, the court found that race would be a necessary factor for 
consideration.152  
In addressing the second Grutter factor—the school district could not 
utilize quotas—the court held that the Seattle School District’s plan did not 
have a quota because it did not “reserve a fixed number of slots for students 
based on race.”153  The court reasoned, under Grutter, an attention to 
numbers to “enroll a critical mass of minority students in order ‘to realize 
the educational benefits of a diverse student body’” was not 
unconstitutional.154  First, the court described the lack of a fixed number of 
slots in that the program was only instituted if the particular school was 
outside the percent variance limits and was oversubscribed.155  Second, the 
court found similarities between the school district’s program and the 
University of Michigan’s attempt to enroll a critical mass of students in 
Grutter.  The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the 
percent of minority enrollment in the PICS case was larger than that in the 
Grutter case, the school district was seeking to enroll more than a critical 
mass and thus had sought to establish a quota.156  Instead, the court went 
back to its context-specific requirement, stating that what critical mass 
entails for one context may not be what it entails for another, and that the 
percentage trigger in the school district’s plan was a common one.157 
The court then turned to the third Grutter factor—the school district had 
to have seriously considered race-neutral alternatives.158  The court of 
appeals previously decided that the school district had failed to seriously 
consider race-neutral alternatives.159  Reiterating the need for a racial 
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diversity, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, examined four race-neutral 
alternatives that had been presented both in the briefs and during argument 
before the court of appeals.160 
First, the court looked to using poverty as a tiebreaker and noted that the 
school board’s reluctance to implement such a tiebreaker was based on 
valid factors that considered the connotations of classifying oneself into a 
lower socioeconomic status.161   
Second, the court looked at a plan submitted by the Urban League, which 
looked to increase quality at all schools and to create a neighborhood school 
model.162  Referring to testimony that the plan did nothing to ameliorate de 
facto segregation, the court held that “[i]t was therefore permissible for the 
district to reject a plan that neither comported with its priorities nor 
achieved its compelling interests.”163   
Third, the court turned to the school district’s consideration of a lottery 
plan.  The court found two major flaws with this plan.  First, the argument 
that a lottery program was a feasible alternative to the racial tiebreaker was 
not once introduced at trial and was argued for the first time on appeal.164  
Second, because the issue was not addressed by the plaintiffs at trial, the 
lottery argument was based only on assumptions that lottery applicants 
would not be racially skewed themselves.165  The court referred to 
testimony by the district superintendent, highlighting that the majority of 
applicants for a particular school were from the neighborhood; thus, the 
lottery pool would be skewed in favor of perpetuation of neighborhood 
segregation patterns.166 
Finally, the court turned to the dissent’s argument that the school district 
should apply an apparently successful race-neutral alternative used in San 
Francisco.167  Again, the court noted two problems with the San Francisco 
plan.  First, the plan was nowhere to be found in the record; rather, it was 
only offered by the dissent.168  Second, the court noted that the school 
district was not forced to adopt a plan implemented elsewhere simply 
because the other plan appeared to be working.  The court found especially 
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relevant the notion that states are “laboratories to be used to experiment 
with myriad approaches to resolving social problems.”169  The court also 
turned to Justice Brandeis’s much-quoted dissent in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann to expound on its rationale:   
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.170 
Thus, if one state were required to adopt another state’s plan for combating 
de facto segregation, no heterogeneity of solutions would develop and the 
notion of state experimentation would effectively be lost.  
The court then turned to the fourth Grutter factor—that a narrowly 
tailored plan cause no undue harm to members of any racial group.  First, 
the court reasoned that the burden imposed by the plan was a minimal one 
and was shared by all students.171  Second, the court noted that there is no 
right in Washington to attend one’s school of choice.172  Third, the court 
recognized that public schools are different than universities in that there is 
generally mandatory school assignment.173  The court then recognized that 
the racial tiebreaker does not burden or benefit any one race, but that all 
races in the school district can reap the burdens and benefits of the 
tiebreaker.174 
Finally, the court analyzed the application of the fifth Grutter factor—
whether the racial tiebreaker had a “sunset provision.”  The court looked to 
Grutter itself and its explanation that “periodic reviews to determine 
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student diversity” 
satisfy the sunset provision requirement.175  The court then noted that the 
Seattle School District revisits its plan annually and had made changes to 
the plan when it felt such changes were necessary.176  Based on its 
conclusion that the school district had satisfied all of the applicable Grutter 
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factors, the court concluded that the plan was, in fact, narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling state interest.177 
The dissent came to a diametrically opposed conclusion on the question 
of whether there was a compelling interest.  First, the dissent equated the 
remedying of de facto segregation to racial balancing.178  By taking this first 
step, the dissent was then able to analogize all cases in which racial 
balancing (as opposed to remedying de facto segregation) had been struck 
down.179  Second, the dissent took those cases that were struck down and 
equated them to a rule that racial balancing could never be used, defining 
Grutter as one of two exceptions to that rule (the other exception being to 
remedy the past effects of de jure segregation).  In doing this, the dissent 
was able to say that any case that did not remedy past effects of de jure 
segregation must look exactly like Grutter.180  Third, the dissent cited 
Grutter for the proposition that any diversity plan that does not focus on the 
student’s individual characteristics runs afoul of the Constitution.181  It 
stated, “[i]n Grutter and Gratz, the Court made clear that the valid 
compelling interest in ‘diversity’ does not translate into a valid compelling 
interest in ‘racial diversity.’”182  Finally, the dissent attacked the 
sociological evidence relied upon by the majority, instead relying on its 
own handpicked evidence.183  It then turned to the narrowly tailored issue.  
Based on its earlier assumption that there was no difference between the 
interests in Grutter and those in PICS, the dissent could apply all five 
Grutter factors rather than the four relied upon by the majority.184  The first 
factor, as the dissent pointed out, failed on its face in a manner that was 
“self-evident.”185   
The dissent then claimed that the second factor—related to the absence of 
quotas—was not met because the school district used percentages compared 
to the population to determine if a school was out of balance.186  Finally, the 
dissent pointed out a flaw in the majority’s critical mass argument.  In 
Grutter, the court stated that critical mass could not be used “simply to 
assure within its student body some specific percentage of a particular 
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group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”187  With the third Grutter 
factor—that the district must have considered race-neutral alternatives—the 
dissent framed the issue not as whether the superintendent had considered 
the alternatives, but whether he had seriously considered adopting the 
alternatives.  The dissent concluded he had not.  Turning to the fourth 
Grutter factor—dealing with undue burden—the dissent again disagreed 
with the majority.  The dissent felt that there was an undue burden in 
depriving children of their choice of school and in imposing a “tedious 
cross-town commute.”188  Finally, the dissent disagreed that the sunset 
provision was really a sunset provision at all, arguing that Grutter required 
both a periodic review and a logical end; thus, the periodic review by the 
school district did not satisfy the logical end requirement.189   
The dissent’s arguments, however, failed to explain that the majority did 
not attempt to make any argument based on diversity.  Rather, the majority 
stressed a compelling interest based on racial diversity on its own, not 
relying on the same compelling interest used in Grutter.190  By fostering 
those incorrect assumptions, it was able to make piecemeal comparisons to 
Grutter in deciding that the interest is not compelling.191  It is 
consummately hypocritical to attack sociological evidence on the basis that 
it is handpicked by utilizing contrary sociological evidence that is also 
handpicked. 
The dissent relied on wording from Gratz, which the dissent read as 
holding that a program or plan involved a quota if it operated on “fixed 
number or percentage.”192  Thus, the dissent utilized part of a quote by the 
court in Grutter and ignored the preceding sentence in which the Grutter 
court stated “a ‘quota’ is a program in which a certain number or proportion 
of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively’ for certain minority groups.”193 
However, the dissent failed to take into account that Grutter did not deal 
with a compelling interest related to ameliorating de facto segregation.  
Rather Grutter only addressed diversity.  The dissent failed to recognize 
that the school board itself considered the other plans as outlined above.  
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Simply because the consideration of plans was informal and not ultimately 
adopted, did not make it inadequate.   
In essence, the dissent implied that if you are denied acceptance to your 
first choice of schools, you are unduly burdened.  If such an argument was 
accepted, every school that denied a student petition to transfer to another 
school, regardless of the reason for denial, could face a lawsuit on the basis 
that they unduly burdened their students.  The same logic could be used for 
the commute argument in rural school districts—where children routinely 
face bus rides of upwards of an hour to get to the nearest school.194  While 
the students in the PICS case complained of total commute times of four 
hours, there was no finding of fact as to that assertion.  Given the evidence 
that a commute by bus from Ballard High School (the school the students in 
the PICS suit wished to attend) and Ingraham High School (where the 
students were ultimately  placed) is roughly forty-two minutes each way, 
the undue burden argument starts to unravel.195  In addition, the larger 
argument hits a snag, for a logical end to the need of achieving the racial 
diversity compelling interest would be when the city itself is no longer de 
facto segregated (and, thus, racial diversity would be had at every school 
within the district).  Theoretically, the dissent would have had no problem 
with a twenty-five-year sunset provision if it had found that racial diversity 
was a compelling state interest and that twenty-five years was a reasonable 
time for the city to correct segregated housing patterns.196 
Unfortunately, the dissent’s reasoning was given credence at the Supreme 
Court, striking a blow to Brown and to attempts at remedying de facto 
segregation in public schools. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT197 
A. The Majority and Plurality Opinions  
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority, which encompases Parts I, 
II, III-A, and III-C of the opinion, and was joined by Justices Scalia, 
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Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.  In addition to establishing the facts, these 
sections explained that the case was not moot, that strict scrutiny applied, 
that the racial interest asserted was not compelling, and that the Seattle plan 
was not narrowly tailored.198   
There are several problems inherent in the majority opinion.  First, the 
plurality employed an unfounded assumption in deciding whether the case 
was moot.  Second, the Court utilized the wrong level of scrutiny.  Third, 
the Court used an unjustified distinction between de facto and de jure 
segregation.  Fourth, the plurality used internally inconsistent reasoning in 
regards to the narrowly tailored issue.  Finally, the plurality wrongly 
addressed racial balancing instead of racial diversity.        
The plurality’s first error was its assumption as to harm in determining 
standing.  The school district argued that standing was not met because 
there was no imminent injury.199  The plurality stated that simply having 
children in schools in the district was enough to satisfy the standing 
requirement.200  However, simply being in the school is not enough.  As was 
stated by the Washington Supreme Court in answering the certified 
question, there is simply no benefit or detriment to any particular child, as 
each child receives a Washington State basic education.201  Thus, there 
would be no harm to any students assigned under the plan, as they would all 
obtain the same basic education.   
Second, the Court utilized the wrong level of scrutiny.  In deciding to use 
the highest level of scrutiny, the plurality stated, “[i]t is well established that 
when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of 
individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict 
scrutiny.”202  However, in this case, as noted above, there were no benefits 
or burdens distributed on the basis of race.  Here, the burdens and benefits 
of a racial classification system were shared by all.  The Court seems to 
think, contrary to the Washington Supreme Court, that the school district’s 
racial tiebreaker operated in much the same way as an affirmative action 
program.   
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Unfortunately, such a view fails to take into account the aim of the 
program to create racial diversity for its own positive outcomes for the 
benefit of all students.  For instance, while the students complained of the 
deleterious effects of being unable to attend the school of choice, the Court 
did not recognize that those students were in essence granted an increased 
chance at academic achievement.203  In practice, students who attend more 
integrated schools have increased academic achievement as measured by 
test scores.204  Absent a showing of a negative effect to the white students, it 
would seem that this is not affirmative action (the granting of privilege to 
one to the impairment of another), but rather a process of maximizing the 
effects of education across the board.  
Beyond the Court’s failure to utilize the correct standard, its use of strict 
scrutiny for segregation programs is outdated.  The Court’s use of strict 
scrutiny highlights its failure to recognize an inherent difference between 
discriminatory programs and those that neutralize structural 
discrimination.205  Rather, the Court should use a common sense approach 
and recognize that programs that ameliorate de facto segregation are not 
discriminatory.  In such cases, the Court should then apply the test to 
facially neutral laws, under which the Court would require both a disparate 
impact on a racial group as well as a discriminatory purpose.206  In 
recognizing white privilege, a court would not be able to satisfy the second 
prong of the test in desegregation cases, and race-based programs such as 
the school district’s would not be invalidated.  This would ensure a system 
in which true equality of the races is the focus and not just a structure 
implying equality but which fails to provide it.  Such an interpretation 
would be more in line with the framers’ intent to provide true equality to the 
races and not simply structural equality.207  
Third, the Court’s distinction between de facto and de jure segregation is 
by no means justified.  In outlining interests that have been found to be 
compelling, the court stated that “it suffices to note that our prior cases, in 
evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have 
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recognized two interests that qualify as compelling . . . .  The first is the 
compelling interest of remedying the effects of past discrimination.”208   
Still, despite the Court’s reluctance as a result of the belief that all 
segregation is harmful regardless of its source, activists have long sought 
the abandonment of the distinction between de facto and de jure 
segregation.209   As soon as Brown was decided, there were calls for full 
integration—not just the remedying of de jure segregation.210  
Unfortunately, twenty years after Brown, the Court reaffirmed the 
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation in Keyes.  Many 
scholars have seen Keyes as an example of the Court backing away from the 
promise of full integration by failing to remedy all segregation and instead 
narrowly requiring desegregation only in those districts where de jure 
segregation existed or where a showing could be made that district policies 
and practices intended to segregate through state action.211  By making that 
distinction, the Court has effectively hindered the education of minority 
students, which is just as affected by de facto segregation as it is by de jure 
segregation.212  The other inherent problem with limiting remedies to de 
jure segregation is that no effort is required to curb resegregation; this 
effectively allows for the loss of any progress made wherever the state did 
not directly participate in the resegregation process.213   
Further, the evolution of desegregation jurisprudence has limited the 
scope of what can be done to remedy de facto segregation.214  
Unconstitutional discrimination was “the negative disparate effects on 
school children generative by various educational policies and practices.”215  
Today, the definition of unconstitutional discrimination has become 
“racially motivated decision making which fails to treat a person as an 
individual,”216.  This view severely limits the scope of what can be done to 
remedy de facto segregation because to remedy the effects of any 
segregation, de facto or de jure, requires more than simply removing 
barriers that were previously in place.217 
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Of course, the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation 
exposes another inherent problem with the Court’s analysis: the Court’s 
flawed perception that race neutrality can lead to just results.  Much like the 
perpetrators of race-neutral rhetoric, the Court has, in essence, adopted a 
colorblind individualism as its mode of thinking.218  The model, which 
claims to do away with racial distinctions by focusing solely on the 
individual, is inherently flawed in that it fails to take into consideration 
those structural privileges granted to members of the majority which do not, 
by nature, operate on an individualized basis.219  The better approach would 
be to look for ways to create structural diversity.  This would break down 
those structural privileges and act to create diverse relationships.  Color-
sensitive paradigms could be broken down at their core and not just 
facially.220  In fact, the Court never recognized the existence of these 
structural privileges.  Rather than focusing on the school district’s program 
as a way to level access to education, the Court instead determined that the 
inability of the plaintiffs to regain a previously held privilege amounted to 
discrimination.   
The lead plurality, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, contains similar problems. The 
plurality’s decision on whether race alone is a compelling interest does not 
accord with its own reasoning.  The plurality stated, “[t]he districts offer no 
evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted 
educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of 
the respective school districts.”221  The Court further reasoned: 
Nor did it demonstrate in any way how the educational and social 
benefits of racial diversity or avoidance of racial isolation are more 
likely to be achieved at a school that is 50 percent white and 50 
percent Asian-American, which would qualify as diverse under 
Seattle’s plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-American, 
25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white, which under Seattle’s 
definition would be racially concentrated.222 
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Here the Court seems to be developing a new test for strict scrutiny to be 
applied where racial diversity is alleged to be a compelling state interest.  
However, the school district was never afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence on this clarified issue, and remand to the trial court would be 
appropriate rather than a wholesale ban on the school district’s use of race 
in school assignments.  Moreover, the Court simply glossed over the fact 
that such a hard use of data to arrive at the stated benefit was not required 
under Grutter.223 
Finally, the plurality moved the conversation from racial diversity—the 
stated compelling interest—to racial balancing, which the school district 
never sought as a compelling state interest.  The plurality explained, 
“[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a 
compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’”224  
However, the school district never sought a racially balanced school; rather, 
it sought a diverse school that was within large percentage ranges from the 
community.  Under the school district’s plan, a school could be racially 
diverse and still not be balanced with the diversity (or lack thereof) of the 
community.   
The Court also failed to recognize that emerging sociological data may be 
available to lend support to the notion that racial balancing itself should be 
considered a compelling interest.  However, to call this simply a relabeling 
of the key issue is to ignore the intricacies and differences between racial 
diversity and the diversity of ideas found compelling in Grutter.  
B. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy joined only in Parts I (statement of facts), II (standing 
and jurisdiction), III-A (application of strict scrutiny and discussion of a 
compelling state interest), and III-C (ineffectiveness of the Seattle plan  
showing lack of a narrowly tailored plan) of the plurality opinion.225  
However, Justice Kennedy expressed grave concerns that the plurality 
opinion was “open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school 
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districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling,” a 
notion he could not endorse.226   
As admirable as Justice Kennedy’s recognition of this matter was, he still 
refused to provide any aggressive means of curtailing the problem and 
instead allowed school districts only facially neutral means—such as 
redistricting—and those means outlined in Grutter.227  This argument 
completely ignores the point made by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg that using facially neutral means to achieve a race-based goal is 
simply sweeping the problem under the rug.228 
C. Justice Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens’s short dissent makes a point of agreeing wholeheartedly 
with Justice Breyer’s dissent.229  His dissent then addresses the plurality’s 
use of Brown: 
 There is cruel irony in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s reliance on our 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.  The first sentence in the 
concluding paragraph of his opinion states: “Before Brown, 
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to 
school based on the color of their skin.”  This sentence reminds me 
of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he majestic equality of the 
la[w] forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to bed in 
the streets, and to steal their bread.”  THE CHIEF JUSTICE fails 
to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; 
indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children 
struggling to attend black schools.230 
By bringing this proposition to the forefront, Justice Stevens was able to 
point out that while the Court followed the letter of Brown, it ignored the 
spirit of the case; he went on to discuss the plurality’s misguided notion that 
strict scrutiny should always apply whenever race is used, regardless of 
whether the purpose is for integration or segregation.231  He concluded his 
dissent by stating: 
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 The Court has changed significantly since it decided School 
Comm. of Boston in 1968.  It was then more faithful to Brown and 
more respectful of our precedent than it is today.  It is my firm 
conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 
would have agreed with today’s decision.232 
D. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
Justice Breyer, who was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
in his dissent, also highlighted the lack of context in which the plurality 
decided the case.233  After a lengthy discussion of the rationale behind 
Brown and its progeny, as well as a lengthy discussion of the histories of the 
Seattle and Louisville school districts, Justice Breyer  moved on to the legal 
discussion.  There, he discussed the applicable legal standard and then 
explained both the majority’s misapplication of precedent and the 
consequences of the plurality decision. 
First, Justice Breyer outlined the standards at play.  The dissent noted that 
strict scrutiny does in fact apply.234  However, Justice Breyer also pointed 
out that the application of the strict scrutiny standard differs when applied 
to an inclusive program as opposed to an exclusionary program.  He stated:  
[T]he cases to which the plurality refers, though all applying to 
strict scrutiny, do not treat exclusive and inclusive uses the same.  
Rather, they apply the strict scrutiny in a manner that is “fatal in 
fact” only to racial classifications that harmfully exclude; they 
apply the test in a manner that is not fatal in fact to racial 
classifications that seek to include.235 
Thus, though the Court in the past has purported to apply strict scrutiny to 
racial classification, it actually has applied two separate permutations of the 
standard depending on the use.236  Justice Breyer’s contention is simple: 
context matters.  Here, the context was that of overcoming segregation 
through a limited use of race.237 
In applying the legal standard, Justice Breyer first looked at whether 
there was a compelling state interest.238  His analysis largely mirrored that 
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of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion and does not bear repeating here.  
Justice Breyer did concede that the studies were conflicting as to whether 
there was a benefit that was compelling, but he noted that the “evidence 
supporting an educational interest in racially integrated schools is well 
established and strong enough to permit a democratically elected school 
board reasonably to determine that this interest is a compelling one.”239 
Turning to whether the plan was narrowly tailored, Justice Breyer 
asserted that the plans were designed to pass “even the strictest ‘tailoring’ 
test.”240  First, the dissent pointed out that the predominant factor in nearly 
90 percent of assignments is based on choice, not race.241  Second, the 
dissent noted that the plan, because of its limited use in only a certain 
number of situations, was more narrowly tailored than the plan approved in 
Grutter—the plan in Grutter applied to all applications to the school.242  
Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the tailoring in Grutter caused the 
possible loss of a higher education, something not at risk in the Seattle and 
Louisville plans.  Finally, the dissent noted that the tailoring must happen at 
the local level due to each city’s personal experience with its own history of 
segregation.243  In rebutting the plurality’s contention that the school district 
had not proven that any other set of numbers could accomplish the same 
compelling need, Justice Breyer noted that the Court had previously 
“permitted districts to use target ratios based upon the district’s underlying 
population.”244  Looking to constitutionally viable options proposed by the 
plurality, Justice Breyer pointed out that these were not pragmatic: 
[A]s to “strategic site selection,” Seattle has built one new high 
school in the last 44 years (and that specialized school serves only 
300 students) . . . .  As to “drawing” neighborhood “attendance 
zones” on a racial basis, Louisville tried it, and it worked only 
when forced busing was also part of the plan.  As to “allocating 
resources for special programs,” Seattle and Louisville have both 
experimented with this; indeed, these programs are often referred 
to as “magnet schools,” but the limited desegregation effect of 
these efforts extends at most to those few school to which 
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additional resources are granted . . . .  As to “recruiting faculty” on 
the basis of race, both cities have tried, but only as one part of a 
broader program.  As to “tracking enrollments, performance and 
other statistics by race,” tracking reveals the problem; it does not 
cure it.245 
Thus, the plurality took away an option that had worked to increase racial 
diversity within the schools and, instead, replaced it with a list of options 
that were not feasible given the constraints placed upon a school district. 
The dissent then turned to direct precedent regarding the plans at issue.  
Justice Breyer recognized that both plans, largely unchanged, and, if 
anything, even less reliant on race, have been found to be constitutional.246  
In regards to the Seattle plan, the “Court struck down a state referendum 
that effectively barred implementation of Seattle’s desegregation plan and 
‘burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts 
throughout the State.’”247  Justice Breyer found it “difficult to believe that 
the Court that held unconstitutional a referendum that would have interfered 
with the implementation of this plan thought that the integration plan it 
sought to preserve was itself an unconstitutional plan.”248  Finally, the 
dissent listed several consequences of the plurality opinion, including 
invalidation of many segregation plans, a litany of litigation where race is 
used as a factor, and the civic and social problems inherent in a segregated 
environment.249 
Unfortunately, given the outcome, Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, and 
not the majority.  Justice Breyer sums up the disappointment felt by many: 
The last half-century has witnessed great strides toward racial 
equality, but we have not yet realized the promise of Brown.  To 
invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of 
Brown.  The plurality’s position, I fear, would break that promise.  
This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to 
regret.250 
The Seattle School District’s plan is now constitutionally invalid, and the 
district must look to alternatives in order to battle de facto segregation. 
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VI. INTEGRATING CRITICAL RACE THEORY INTO ADVOCACY  
With the passage of I-200 and similar measures in other states, and given 
the outcome in PICS, a new strategy is required that applies critical race 
theory within the construct of our legal system.  Legislators need to be 
aware of critical race theory and, in so doing, need to repeal legislation 
preventing its recognition.  Within the courts, advocates need to reframe the 
dialogue to include notions of critical race theory.  By integrating the 
language of this theory into legal advocacy, both the courts and the 
legislature will reframe the dialogue away from its current race-neutral state 
and toward true racial equality. 
There are two avenues that future litigators must simultaneously pursue 
in order to effectively bring to the forefront notions of white privilege and 
other concepts central to critical race theory.  First, advocates must integrate 
the language and theory of white privilege into their arguments.  Second, 
advocates must utilize sociological data as it emerges to effectively present 
and argue the issues. 
A. Integrating Critical Race Theory into Lawyering 
Part of the problem of integrating critical race theory into judicial 
opinions lies simply in the fact that those notions are not being argued in 
court.  One remedy is to integrate the theory into briefs.  Rather than simply 
discuss how this may happen, this comment demonstrates this proposition 
by rewriting portions of each section of the school district’s brief in the 
PICS case. 
1. Questions Presented 
“You never get a second chance to make a first impression.”251  This 
cliché has ready applicability in the legal context where the first glance at a 
brief can set the lens through which a court will read the rest of the brief.252  
As such, it is vitally important that an advocate set the tone for the reader 
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from the start by integrating notions of critical race theory in briefing.  For 
example, an issue statement posed by the school district read: 
(2) Did the Seattle School District’s limited consideration of race 
in its high school student assignment plan comply with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because: 
(a) the District had compelling government interests in promoting 
the educational benefits of diverse public high school enrollments, 
alleviating the potential harms of racial isolation, and ensuring 
equitable access for minority students to the District’s most 
popular high schools, and (b) the limited consideration of race in 
the District’s student assignment plan was narrowly tailored to 
serve these compelling interests while promoting the race-neutral 
educational values of parental choice, neighborhood schools, and 
keeping families together.253 
There are several flaws with framing the issue this way.  First, the issue 
statement effectively swept notions of race and justice under the rug by 
referring to the consideration of race as limited.  Though the issue may 
facially appear to be whether race can be used in some limited fashion in 
these types of cases—as several justices alluded to—this case was 
essentially about whether a school district may use race to remedy de facto 
segregation.  In this context, minimizing the school district’s use of race 
conceals the real issue.  Second, the advocate again shied away from the 
controversy in the case by referring only to diversity instead of racial 
diversity.  Third, the advocate used the term “alleviating the potential harms 
of racial isolation.”254  This  weakened the idea of the harm involved by not 
using race as a factor.  Finally, the advocate used notions of race neutrality, 
ignoring that the reality of racism is a very real, ever-present problem.   
This issue statement could be rewritten to identify the heart of the case 
and, more specifically, steer the discussion to the most contentious points 
that the justices will confront: 
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(2) Did the School District’s consideration of race in its high 
school assignment plan comply with the Equal Protection Clause’s 
mandate for true equality because 
(a) the District had a compelling government interest in promoting 
the educational benefits of racially diverse public high school 
enrollments, alleviating the real harms of segregation, and ensuring 
equal access to education within the District’s schools, and 
(b) the consideration of race in the District’s student assignment 
plan was narrowly tailored to achieve diversity while remedying 
the effects of current segregation within the District. 
Reframing the case to be about current segregation is more forceful.  No 
longer are we talking about some vague past nonstate discrimination.  We 
are talking about a problem that is happening now that requires immediate 
attention.  This problem is about one thing: race.  The solution is about one 
thing: race.  By not burying the real issues in rhetoric that panders to a 
highly conservative plurality, we can more effectively frame the issue for 
those justices who may be on the fence in the future. 
2. Statement of the Case 
Similarly, opportunities arise in the statement of the case in which critical 
race theory can be interjected without utilizing additional space.  Consider 
this passage from the respondent’s brief: 
The Open Choice plan used a series of tiebreakers to determine 
assignments to over-subscribed schools.  At the high school level, 
the first tiebreaker was whether the student had a sibling already 
assigned to the school.  The second tiebreaker was proximity of the 
student’s residence to the school.  The proximity tiebreaker was 
subject, at some over-subscribed schools, to an “integration 
tiebreaker.”  For the 1999–2000 school year, the integration 
tiebreaker applied to over-subscribed schools with enrollments 
deviating more than 10 percentage points from the overall district-
wide racial composition.  The integration tiebreaker accordingly 
applied in that year to four over-subscribed high schools: Ballard, 
Hale, and Roosevelt as to non-white students and Franklin as to 
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white students.  Students who did not choose a school were 
assigned to the closest school with space available.255 
Again, the advocate misses several opportunities to highlight the real issues 
in this case, instead burying those issues in race-neutral rhetoric.  The 
advocate fails to highlight that the key issue is de facto segregation, a 
current problem that requires immediate attention.  Rather, the advocate 
should highlight that de facto segregated schools require a race-positive 
procedure to remedy the issue.  The same paragraph could be presented in a 
more revealing light: 
The Open Choice plan used a series of tiebreakers to determine 
assignments to over-subscribed schools.  In segregated schools, the 
first tiebreaker was whether the student had a sibling already 
assigned to the school.  The second tiebreaker depended on the 
race of the student, and served to remedy de facto segregation.  
The third tiebreaker was proximity of the student’s residence to the 
school.  In non-segregated schools, the racial tiebreaker was not 
applied.  For the 1999-2000 school year, schools deviating more 
than 10 percentage points from the overall district-wide racial 
composition applied this racial tiebreaker to ameliorate that de 
facto segregation.  The integration tiebreaker accordingly applied 
in that year to five over-subscribed high schools: Ballard, Hale, 
Roosevelt, and Franklin.  Students who did not choose a school 
were assigned to the closest school with space available. 
The preceding paragraph contains several key aspects.  First, it addresses 
race and segregation openly.  To say otherwise is to pretend that those 
issues are not what this case is about.  Second, the passage now plainly 
addresses that the goal of the second tiebreaker is to remedy the effects of 
de facto segregation.  By addressing this up front, it is simultaneously 
asserted that this is not a race-neutral issue: race-neutral rhetoric does not 
lend itself to remedying the effects of discrimination, only outright 
racism.256  Finally, the passage does not differentiate between schools that 
are segregated in favor of whites or in favor of blacks.  Segregation is 
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segregation.  Each of the five schools to which the tiebreaker applied was 
segregated and that point should not be divided across racial lines.  
3. Argument 
In this section, this comment will offer alternative approaches to some of 
the major sections of the respondent’s brief in the PICS case.  These 
alternatives provide further examples of how advocates can weave critical 
race theory into their arguments. 
a) An Actual Case or Controversy No Longer Exists 
The school district’s argument that the case is moot because it was no 
longer using the tiebreaker does little to further the question of whether a 
school district has the inherent authority to use a race-conscious tiebreaker 
to ameliorate de facto segregation.  While arguing that the case is moot may 
provide redress by allowing the respondent to avoid fees and costs, by doing 
so, the school district weakened its own argument.  By arguing that because 
the practice is no longer continued there can be no wrong, the rest of the 
brief is immediately tainted.  If the racial tiebreaker was never wrong, then 
why was it discontinued?   
In order to more effectively advocate for the use of racial means to 
ameliorate de facto segregation, the admission of a controversy in this case 
must be embraced.  Eliminating an argument of mootness would allow the 
advocate to instead argue that the case is in fact a live and real controversy.  
An advocate could utilize this space to explain why a race-neutral view of 
the case is not in fact neutral and also seek to redefine the concept of an 
Article III “case” or “controversy” to include the actual injuries suffered at 
the often invisible hand of white privilege.  Over time, this method could 
begin to effectively seed critical race theory in the minds of judges and 
justices, rather than leaving the debate strictly to academia. 
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b) Seattle’s Consideration of Race Was Designed to Further Compelling 
Interests 
Obviously, the argument that ameliorating de facto segregation was a 
compelling state interest, unlike mootness, cannot be simply scrapped for 
the sake of introducing a new paradigm.  But that does not mean that this 
section is not ripe with opportunities to integrate critical race theory.  For 
example, see the following passage from the respondent’s brief in the PICS 
case: 
Although this Court has never specifically held that there is a 
compelling interest in achieving the benefits of integrated public 
schools where there has not been a finding of intentional 
discrimination, it has repeatedly recognized both the importance of 
eliminating the harmful effects of racially isolated schools, 
regardless of the reasons that those conditions exist, and school 
districts’ inherent authority to address this problem.  This Court 
stated in Brown with respect to segregation that: “The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law . . . .”257 
Here, the advocate focuses on what the Court already has recognized, 
attempting the time-honored legal trick of fitting a square peg into a round 
hole that the Court has already accepted.  Rather, the argument should 
instead focus on what the Court has not yet recognized, and why the Court 
needs to accept remedying de facto segregation as its own compelling 
interest.  Admittedly, the brief does a great job of outlining why a racially 
diverse education is beneficial for all students,258 but this largely operates 
on race-neutral rhetoric.259  Rather, the argument could be easily retooled to 
include powerful critical race theory arguments: 
While this Court has never specifically found it a compelling 
interest, there are very real and harmful effects to de facto 
segregation.  These are the same harms that come from de jure 
segregation.  While one can begin to heal the effects of state-
sponsored de jure segregation through race-neutral means, only a 
color-conscious solution will ameliorate the misery inherent in 
nonstate sponsored segregation.260  This Court has repeatedly 
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recognized this reality.  This Court stated in Brown with respect to 
segregation that “[t]he impact is greater when it has the sanction of 
the law . . .,” but it never stated that there is no impact when the 
segregation is not sanctioned by law. 
 In the preceding sections, there is a method.  These arguments, as 
rewritten, do several things: they emphasize that the real issue, de facto 
segregation, should be addressed openly and honestly as a real, current 
problem; they advocate that the use of race should not be minimized or 
hidden; and, finally, they reiterate that race is an essential part of the 
solution.  This open, honest discussion of societal issues around race is the 
heart of critical race theory. 
B. Using Social Science Data to Support the Proposition that De Facto 
Segregation is Harmful 
PICS may signal an emerging trend in cases aimed at remedying de facto 
segregation.  Racial diversity may in fact be beneficial to both white and 
nonwhite alike; early studies have shown that a racially diverse classroom 
could improve the critical thinking skills of white students at a greater rate 
than minority students.261  Unfortunately, there have been very few studies 
of this nature below the postsecondary level.  As data becomes available, it 
should be easier to make a case that would allow for racial diversity to be 
considered in and of itself.  This would lend further support to racial 
diversity alone being a compelling state interest at the secondary education 
level—an issue that the Court avoided in PICS.262 
The use of this kind of sociological data to prove the disparate effects of 
supposed race neutrality may become commonplace within the courts.  One 
recent case out of the Supreme Court suggests that sociological data may be 
gaining acceptance. 
In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Supreme Court was asked, in a habeas 
petition, to examine a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on 
potential black jurors.263  In its decision, the Court first noted that there 
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were problems in applying the Swain test: to prove discriminatory intent, 
the petitioner would have to show systematic discrimination, a “crippling 
burden of proof” to preserve one’s rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause.264  The Court also noted similar problems with the test set forth in 
Batson, where challenging the prosecution’s individual use of a peremptory 
challenge could be defended by showing any valid reason for that particular 
challenge.265  Instead, the Court looked at the fact that white jurors were 
found to be acceptable by prosecutors even though those jurors exhibited 
the very same qualities that the prosecutor put forward as Batson defenses 
(a neutral reason for excluding the black jurors) to his decision.266  Thus, by 
utilizing a facially valid defense to a peremptory challenge, prosecutors are 
able to disclude black jurors though white jurors should have been excluded 
for the same reason.  Though structurally racist, the burden on defendants to 
show that racism was too high.  The Court reasoned, “If the stated reason 
does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial 
judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been 
shown up as false.”267 
While the Court could have stopped there, it also expressed concern over 
data which showed a possible systemic problem of facial race neutrality 
masking racism.268  First, the Court looked to the process of “jury 
shuffling,” a seemingly neutral process whereby the order of prospective 
jurors is literally shuffled.269  The Court noted that the process was applied 
generally to those cases in which black jurors were at the front of the jury 
pool, the practice being employed in the case at hand in the same manner.270  
The Court cited its previous decision to explain the problem with this 
process: 
[T]he prosecution's decision to seek a jury shuffle when a 
predominant number of African-Americans were seated in the 
front of the panel, along with its decision to delay a formal 
objection to the defense's shuffle until after the new racial 
composition was revealed, raise a suspicion that the State sought to 
exclude African-Americans from the jury.271  
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Second, the Court looked to differences in questioning between black and 
white jurors, which showed an attempt to elicit responses from black jurors 
that could provide a basis for a facially race-neutral peremptory 
challenge.272  More importantly, the Court considered this evidence though 
it was not before the state court.273  Based on a statistical analysis of the 
juror questionaires in the case, the Court concluded, “The State’s attempt at 
a race-neutral rationalization thus simply fails to explain what the 
prosecutors did.”274 
Third, the Court looked to the history of juror selection discrimination as 
evidence of current discrimination:   
If anything more is needed for an undeniable explanation of what 
was going on, history supplies it. The prosecutors took their cues 
from a 20-year-old manual of tips on jury selection, as shown by 
their notes of the race of each potential juror. By the time a jury 
was chosen, the State had peremptorily challenged 12% of 
qualified nonblack panel members, but eliminated 91% of the 
black ones.275 
While Miller-El dealt with peremptory challenges in a criminal case, two 
principles can be drawn from this case and applied to cases similar to PICS.  
First, the use of sociological data can become relevant to a case, even if the 
data was developed after the onset of the case.  Thus, a district fighting de 
facto segregation and involved in a lawsuit based on that fight can petition 
studies justifying its position.  Second, the Court expressed a willingness to 
go beyond the race-neutral rationales to look at the real effects of a practice 
or policy.  Such tactics can be integrated into briefs to show why race 
neutrality is anything but neutral.  While the opening created by Miller-El 
may be a narrow one, any chance to challenge the race-neutral perspective 
must be utilized.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
No one can dispute that discrimination, in any form, should have no place 
in our society.  Since the decision in Brown, it is apparent that 
discrimination still exists, preventing us from imagining a stage where it 
can be forgotten.  The voters of the state of Washington underscored this in 
1996; voters in Michigan did the same ten years later.  Misunderstandings 
and misstatements about what race-based programs do, and what they are 
intended to remedy, has only perpetuated the problem.  The PICS case is a 
prime example—where courts fail to recognize systems of white privilege 
and instead characterize a program set up to ameliorate discrimination as 
itself discriminatory.  But school districts cannot simply give up their 
attempt to solve a recognized problem.  Rather, school districts need to 
embrace the fight to ameliorate de facto segregation.  By embracing this 
goal, and utilizing notions of critical race theory in the process, perhaps we 
will be able to escape from the shadow of PICS. 
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Bio., http://www.acri.org/ward_bio.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
60 Heath Foster, Ads and Money Shape I-200 Debate: Affirmative Action Fight May Cost 
$2.3 Million, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 26, 1998, at A1 (noting that the 
American Civil Rights Coalition, the political arm of ACRI, has been the top donor of the 
I-200 campaign); David Postman, California Group Pays for I-200 Radio Ad, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1998, at A7 (citing Ward Connerly as the leader of the Proposition 209 
campaign). 
61 See Media Transparency, supra note 59; American Civil Rights Institute, 
http://www.acri.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
62 See generally Media Transparency, supra note 59. 
63 See Media Transparency, supra note 59.  ACRI backers include the Lynde and Harry 
Bradley Foundation and The Olin Foundation.  The Bradley foundation has been noted as 
the most influential right-wing foundation.  See Media Transparency, Funder Profile: The 
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Inc., http://www.mediatransparency.org/ 
funderprofile.php?funderID=1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).  The Olin Foundation is a 
large supporter of The Heritage Foundation.  See Media Transparency, Funder Profile: 
John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., http://www.mediatransparency.org/funderprofile.php? 
funderID=7 (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 
64 The Bradley Foundation supported Charles Murray’s book, The Bell Curve, that 
supported the proposition that blacks are genetically inferior to whites.  See Media 
Transparency, Funder Profile: The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, supra note 63. 
65 Foster, supra note 60; Postman, supra note 60. 
66 World/Nation Briefs, NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 1999, at A20 (quoting Ward Connerly as 
saying that affirmative action makes “people feel like they’re a victim of reverse 
discrimination”); see also B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Political Briefing; California G.O.P. 
Wary of Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2001, at 133 (“Connerly . . . contends that reverse 
discrimination has become one of the nation’s greatest problems.”); Seth Rosenfeld, Cal 
Hit with Race-Bias Suit: Rights Groups Launch Legal Bid on Behalf of Honor Students 
Denied Admission, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 2, 1999, at A1 (asserting that Ward Connerly 
contends affirmative action is a form of race discrimination); Howard Troxler, “Ifs” 
Abound in Bush’s Plan to End Preferences, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 12, 1999, at 
1B (“Connerly’s supporters believe that affirmative action is reverse discrimination.”). 
67 Linda S. Greene, From Brown to Grutter, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (2004). 
68 Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 301 (1990) 
(“[T]he rhetoric of innocence avoids the argument that white people generally have 
benefited from the oppression of people of color, that white people have been advantaged 
by this oppression in a myriad of obvious and less obvious ways.”). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
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71 Ashley M. Hibbett, The Enigma of Stigma: A Case Study on the Validity of the Stigma 
Arguments Made in Opposition to Affirmative Action Programs in Higher Education, 21 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 75, 98 (2005) (noting that race is an immutable detriment to 
people of color within similar classes, such that people of color will always be at a 
disadvantage to whites within the same class). 
72 RUDOLPH ALEXANDER JR., RACISM, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, 34 
(2005) (citing the fact that in one prominent affirmative action case, the white candidate 
who was denied did not challenge the fact that other white students with lower 
qualifications were admitted, but rather challenged the fact that students of color with 
lower qualifications were admitted). 
73 Ross, supra note 68, at 312 (noting that the repression of unconscious racism allows 
white people to view themselves as innocent). 
74 See DELGADO & STEFFANCIC, supra note 17, at 78. 
75 See id. at 106–07. 
76 Carolyn Crawson, Antonio Ginatta & Peter Antolin, Supplier Diversity Presentation to 
Governor Gregoire’s Executive Cabinet Agency Directors (2006), http://www.omwbe. 
wa.gov/supplierdiversity/materials/Cabinet%20PowerPoint%20Presentation.ppt. 
77 Id. 
78 David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual 
Property, Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1196 n. 
176 (2005) (noting that high school enrollment, graduation, and gifted placement are 
lowest among blacks).  In fact, the high school graduation rates for blacks lies at just over 
50 percent, whereas white and Asian American graduation rates lie near 75 percent.  See 
Julie A. Helling, Law and Diversity Program: A Model for Attracting, Retaining, and 
Preparing Diverse Students for Law School, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 561, 569 
(2006). 
79 See generally Michal Kurlaender & John T. Yun, Is Diversity a Compelling 
Educational Interest?: Evidence from Louisville, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE 
ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 
2001). 
80 See Letter from Vicki Rippie, Executive Director, Public Disclosure Commission, to 
Kelly Evans, No! 200 Campaign Committee (Mar. 23, 2001) (on file with the Public 
Disclosure Commission—PDC Case No. 99-066); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
42.17.100. 
81 Washington State Civil Rights Initiative – YES on 200!, Summary, Full Report, 
Receipts and Expenditure, C4 (Jan. 8, 1999) (Public Disclosure Commission form, on file 
with the Public Disclosure Commission of Washington). 
82 No! 200 Committee, Summary, Full Report, Receipts and Expenditure, C4 (Feb. 8, 
1999) (Public Disclosure Commission form, on file with the Public Disclosure 
Commission of Washington); see also Florangela Davila, Bills Would Let Race Be Factor 
In College Admissions Again; Lawmakers Want to Amend I-200, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2004, at A1; Heath Foster, Affirmative Action Rules Tossed out by State Voters, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 4, 1998, at A1; Richard Roesler, Bill Would Let 
Colleges Consider Ethnicity; Controversial Legislation Defies 5-Year-Old Law, 
SPOKESMAN REV., Jan. 29, 2004, at B1; Herbert A. Sample, Flush with Washington I-200 
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Victory, Connerly Is Looking At Other States, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 10, 
1998, at B3. 
83 Letter from Vicki Rippie, supra note 80. 
84 Id. 
85 CALIFORNIA FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW: 2005, 17 
(2005), available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/Library/2005annual.pdf. 
86 A look at the ethnic makeup of the University of Washington’s professional programs 
showed increases of 32 percent and 73 percent respectively between black and Latino 
students.  See UNIV. OF WASHINGTON, STUDENT HEADCOUNT BY ETHNICITY AND 
STUDENT LEVEL, Table A-5 (2005) [hereinafter Table A-5] (University of Washington 
Autumn Quarter Enrollment Statistics, on file with the registrar’s office). 
87 Between 1998 and 2004, black enrollment in professional programs declined by 2.5 
percent.  More markedly, in the same period Latino enrollment fell by over 40 percent.  
Id. 
88 Sanjay Bhat, Racial Tiebreaker is Illegal, Says Court of Appeals, SEATTLE POST- 
INTELLIGENCER, July 28, 2004, at A1. 
89 See Deborah Bach, Seattle Schools’ Racial Tie-Breaker Policy Upheld, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 21, 2005, at A1; see also Deborah Bach, Schools Can Use 
Race as Tiebreaker, Court Rules, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 2003, at A1. 
90 Bach, supra note 7 (citing 10 percent reduction in minority enrollment at two 
predominately white schools and 10 percent reduction in white enrollment at one 
predominately minority school). 
91 Proposition 209 was passed in 1996 and amended the California State Constitution to 
disallow racial preferences.  See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSITION 209: TEXT OF 
PROPOSED LAW, available at http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/bp/209text.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 
2006); Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences Splits Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 31, 2006, at A1 (reporting that Proposition 209 was also backed by Ward Connerly 
via ACRI); see also McMurtrie, supra note 15.   
92 Steve Padilla, A Call to Increase Black Enrollment at UCLA, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
2006, at B4; University of California Adopts a Holistic Approach to Reviewing Freshman 
Applications; Change is Most Sweeping Since Systemwide Revisions Five Years Ago, 
U.S. STATE NEWS, Sept. 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16883237 (Westlaw). 
93 Padilla, supra note 92.  California’s population at the 2000 census was 6.7% African 
American.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: CALIFORNIA 
(2008), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html. 
94 See generally Tamar Lewin, supra note 58, at P16. 
95 SEATTLE UNIV., Large, Diverse Freshman Class Expected: Seattle U Trend Continues 
to Buck State’s Post-I-200 Higher Ed Climate, July 19, 2001, http://www.seattleu.edu/ 
home/news_events/news/ (click on 2001, scroll to articles in the month of July and click 
on article title). 
96 University of Washington enrolled 1,931 undergraduate underrepresented minorities 
in 2000, with a total of 25,845 students in its undergraduate program, for a total of 7.5% 
undergraduate minority enrollment.  See Table A-5, supra note 86.  Conversely, Seattle 
University maintained 13.5% undergraduate underrepresented minority enrollment in the 
same year.  SEATTLE UNIV., supra note 95. 
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97 See UNIV. OF WASHINGTON, GRADUATE ADMISSION SUMMARY (ETHNIC 
BREAKDOWN) - AUTUMN 2005 (2005), available at http://www.grad.washington.edu/ 
stats/index.htm (law school admissions were omitted by author from the numbers, in 
order to perform like comparisons); SEATTLE UNIV., GRADUATE ENROLLMENT 
STATISTICS (2006), available at http://www.seattleu.edu/home/about_seattle_university/ 
facts/student_profiles/graduate/. 
98 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 285 F.3d 1236, 
1242 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002). 
99 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 137 F. Supp. 2d 
1224, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2001), aff’d en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1228 (citing the Washington Supreme Court’s construction of Article IX § 1, of 
the Washington State Constitution, which provides that “the legislature shall provide for 
a general and uniform system of public schools”). 
102 PICS, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1227 (citing Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. 
Palmason, 495 P.2d 657, 661 (Wash. 1972)).  An important distinction was thus made in 
the Palmason opinion.  Washington schools have never been de facto segregated, and 
thus any bussing actions within the state were only to remedy de facto segregation.  See 
id. at 1229 (citing Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 492 P.2d 536 (Wash. 
1972)) (the Court has interpreted the Washington State Constitution to apply to instances 
of de facto segregation). 
103 Id. at 1229. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1231–32. 
107 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 285 F.3d 1236, 
1244 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1248. 
110 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 294 F.3d 1084 (9th 
Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 294 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 
111 PICS, 294 F.3d at 1088. 
112 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 72 P.3d 151, 153 
(Wash. 2003). 
113 Id. at 159. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 163. 
116 Id. at 166. 
117 Id. at 164–65.  The Washington Supreme Court maintained that the reading adopted 
by the court of appeals would render a section of the Washington Civil Rights Act as 
redundant, that other dictionary definitions of preference are in line with the school 
district’s understanding of the word, and that an informed voter would be aware that 
“reshuffle” programs do not discriminate (a reshuffle program is a neutral balancing 
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program, as opposed to a stacked deck program, which grants a person an advantage over 
a more qualified applicant).  Id. at 165. 
118 Id. at 165. 
119 Id. at 166. 
120 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 377 F.3d 949, 953 
(9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005).  See supra text 
accompanying note 43. 
121 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2751 (2007). 
122 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 137 F. Supp. 2d 
1224, 1232, aff’d en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177 
(2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 PICS, 377 F.3d at 961. 
126 Id. at 963. 
127 Id. at 969. 
128 Id. at 969 (emphasis added). 
129 Id. at 970 (stating that such an “impliably reflexive use of race” cannot be narrowly 
tailored). 
130 Id. at 970 (noting that the application of the tiebreaker “is in fact a de jure [policy] or 
automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[] single ‘soft’ variable” (citing Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (emphasis and editing by the Court of Appeals))). 
131 PICS, 377 F.3d at 970–75 (explaining that the school district had failed to consider a 
lottery system, had not considered race-neutral factors for admission, and had not 
considered a plan by the Urban League working group) (emphasis added by the court). 
132 Id. at 975 (looking to the school district’s decision making in the percent range that a 
school could be racially imbalanced before the racial tiebreaker was centered and noting 
that effect on third parties was not measured proportionally to the benefits which would 
be extruded through the application of the tiebreaker). 
133 Id. at 993–96 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. at 998. 
135 Id. at 1005–08. 
136 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 395 F.3d 1168 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
137 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 426 F.3d 1162, 
1173 n.12 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007).  
138 Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005)). 
139 Id. at 1174–75. 
140 Id. at 1175–76. 
141 Id. at 1177. 
142 Id. at 1179. 
143 Compare id. at 1175–76, with Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 377 F.3d 949, 979 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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144 PICS, 426 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) 
(emphasis in original)). 
145 Id. at 1179; see Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 480, 487 (1982); 
Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978); Keyes v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); N.C. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971). 
146 PICS, 426 F.3d at 1179–80. 
147 Id. at 1180 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003)). 
148 Id. at 1180. 
149 Id. (citing Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
150 Id. at 1181. 
151 Id. at 1182–83. 
152 Id. at 1183 (citing Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
153 Id. at 1184. 
154 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003)). 
155 Id. at 1184–85. 
156 Id. at 1185–86. 
157 Id. at 1186. 
158 Id. at 1187. 
159 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 377 F.3d 949, 970–
75 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the school district had failed to consider a lottery 
system, had not considered race-neutral factors for admission, and had not considered a 
plan by the Urban League working group), withdrawn en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
160 PICS, 426 F.3d at 1188–91. 
161 Id. at 1188–89. 
162 Id. at 1189.  It should be noted that under a neighborhood model, a student would 
remain in his or her current neighborhood.  Thus, any segregation within housing patterns 
would not be ameliorated, but perpetuated. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1190. 
166 Id. at 1189–90. 
167 Id. at 1190. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1190–91 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
171 Id. at 1191 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 
72 P.3d 151, 160 (2003)). 
172 PICS, 426 F.3d at 1191 (citing PICS, 72 P.3d at 159). 
173 Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S 385 (1986)). 
174 Id. at 1192. 
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175 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003)). 
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 1193. 
178 Id. at 1200 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
179 Id. at 1201. 
180 See id. at 1201–02. 
181 Id. at 1202–03. 
182 Id. at 1202. 
183 Id. at 1205–09. 
184 See id. at 1209–10. 
185 Id. at 1210. 
186 Id. at 1212–13. 
187 Id. at 1214 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). 
188 Id. at 1216 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
189 Id. at 1218 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342). 
190 Id. at 1179 (majority opinion) (“[T]he District’s interests in obtaining the educational 
and social benefits of racial diversity in secondary education...[is] clearly compelling.”). 
191 See generally id. at 1202–04 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
192 Id. at 1213 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 270). 
193 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 
(1989)). 
194 For instance, in the school district of Big Sandy, Montana, students were subjected to 
two hours of bus transportation per day on average.  Interview with Laura Edwards, 
former high school student of Big Sandy, Montana (Nov. 15, 2006).  One 2005 report 
shows that such commute times are not at all uncommon for students; thus, they cannot 
be considered unduly burdensome.  DENNIS PURCELL & REXANNA SHACKELFORD, AN 
EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF RURAL SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION: WHAT CHALLENGES 
MAY A NEW ROUND OF RURAL SCHOOL CONSOLIDATIONS HAVE ON THE SAFETY, 
EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF RURAL COMMUNITIES? 
(2005), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_ 
storage_01/0000019b/80/29/90/90.pdf. 
195 Google transit instructions from Ballard High School to Ingraham High School, with 
an arrival time of 7:45 a.m., Google Transit, http://www.google.com/transit (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2008).  Unfortunately, no information is available as to what the students’ 
commute times would have been in 2001 had they been able to attend Ballard High 
School, nor was any determination made as to the veracity of the plaintiff’s allegations as 
to commute times.  However, given the state of public transportation and bussing in 
Seattle, it seems highly unlikely that any bus commute would take two hours in one 
direction. 
196 Twenty-five years was the period in which Justice O’Connor “hoped” that racial 
preferences would no longer be necessary.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
197 I do not address Justice Thomas’s concurrence in this opinion.  Suffice it to say that de 
facto segregation is not segregation at all according to Justice Thomas.  See Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) 
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(Thomas, J., concurring) (“Resegregation is not occurring in Seattle or Louisville; these 
school boards have no present interest in remedying past segregation.”). 
198 PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2746–54, 2759–68 (majority opinion).  
199 Brief for Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 2922956, at *15–18. 
200 PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2751 (2007). 
201 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 166 (2003) 
(“The School District’s open choice plan does not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin as meant by law.  To the extent the tie breaker is race 
conscious, it furthers a core mission of public education; to make available an equal, 
uniform and enriching educational environment to all students within the district.”). 
202 PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2751 (emphasis added). 
203 See generally id. 
204 Kurlaender & Yun, supra note 79, at 116. 
205 This is largely a result of the Court adopting Justice Powell’s reasoning that “[t]he 
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the 
same protection, then it is not equal.”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) 
(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978) (Powell, J., 
announcing the judgment of the court)).  By adopting this reasoning in the Grutter 
opinion, the Court ignores the litany of sociological data that has been developed on 
white privilege since then.  See Darren Lenard Hutchison, “Unexplainable on Grounds 
Other Than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 642 (2003) (“Justice Powell’s analysis implies 
a desire to retire the very notions of privilege.”). 
206 See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (2006) (laying out the two-part test 
for facially neutral laws, which requires a disparate impact and a discriminatory purpose). 
207 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 150. 
208 PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2752. 
209 See generally OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR. & DAVID T. SMITH, DE FACTO SEGREGATION 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1965). 
210 See generally id. 
211 See KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION 
ERA: FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 207 (2005). 
212 See SCHROEDER & SMITH, supra note 209, at 56. 
213 See id. at 212. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 15. 
216 Id. 
217 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729 (1992) (“We do not agree with the Court 
of Appeals or the District Court, however, that the adoption and implementation of race-
neutral policies alone suffice to demonstrate that the State has completely abandoned its 
prior dual system.”).  As I have already demonstrated that the difference between de facto 
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and de jure segregation does not warrant different treatment, race-neutral action alone is 
insufficient to remedy de facto segregation as well. 
218 BROWN, supra note 211, at 190. 
219 White privilege instead operates as a package of privileges issued not on the basis of 
individual achievement, but on the basis of race.  See Stephanie M. Wildman, supra note 
11, at 246. 
220 Patricia Gurin, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan: The 
Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363, 377, 386 
(1999) [hereinafter Gurin Study]. 
221 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2756 (2007). 
222 Id. 
223 In fact, Justice Breyer points out in his dissent that the white/minority differentiation 
may in fact be warranted given the racial breakdown and neighborhood patterns of the 
city.  In addition, the city may have simply been following a federally mandated 
classification system.  See id. at 2829. 
224 Id. at 2758. 
225 Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
226 Id. at 2791. 
227 Id. at 2792. 
228 Transcript of Oral Argument, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No.05-908), 2006 WL 3486958, at *20–23. 
229 PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 2797–98 (internal citations omitted) (alterations by dissent). 
231 Id. at 2798–800. 
232 Id. at 2800. 
233 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to past 
opinions’ rationales, their language, and the contexts in which they arise.”). 
234 Id. at 2817. 
235 Id. 
236 This dual-application of strict scrutiny gives all the more credence to the notion that a 
more lenient standard needs to be laid out by the Court for application in inclusive uses of 
race. 
237 See id. at 2818. 
238 See generally id. at 2811–820. 
239 Id. at 2821.  In fact, some of the opposing studies cited by Justice Thomas in his 
concurrence admit that there is evidence linking integration to increased academic 
achievement.  See id. at 2824. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 2825. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 2825–26. 
244 Id. at 2827. 
245 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
246 Id. at 2830. 
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247 Id. 
248 Id. at 2831. 
249 Id. at 2832–34. 
250 Id. at 2837. 
251 W. Triesthof, A Few Interesting Quotations, http://www.cs.sjsu.edu/faculty/khuri/ 
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